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ABSTRACT
EU-related procedures around ‘policy information’ or ‘regulatory information’
provide clues for possible new directions in attempts to improve such
information and its use in the United States government. This Article presents
two “information infrastructures” as the best shots at infusing political
legislative process with regulatory analysis without technocratizing them and
regulatory cooperation as an additional check on regulatory policies.
I. INTRODUCTION
The kind of comprehensive study of fault lines in the policy-making
process that Peter Schuck has undertaken for his book Why Government
Fails So Often has never been carried out in the context of the European
Union (EU). But if public opinion is to be taken as a relevant indicator
of government failure, Schuck’s diagnosis certainly applies to Europe as
well. Although EU leadership’s approval ratings recovered somewhat from
the dire situation in 2013 when there were only four EU countries with a
clear majority approving, a 2015 poll suggested there is only one country
(Ireland) where a majority thinks EU membership has left it better off.1
Peter Schuck rightly states that a multi-jurisdictional comparison would
make the exercise of pinpointing the drivers for government failure
unmanageably complex.2
Across the Atlantic Ocean, the “brutal facts of public life” differ of
course, as does the institutional context. To mention just one anomaly that
complicates comparisons of EU-US policy performance: the EU institutions
heavily rely on regulatory powers that have been ‘delegated’ to the supra*Anne Meuwese is Professor of European and Comparative Law at Tilburg Law School of
Tilburg University in the Netherlands.
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Jan Sonnenschein & Sofia Kluch, EU Leadership Regains Approval Across Europe,
GALLUP (March 2, 2015), http://www.gallup.com/poll/181772/leadership-regains-approvalacross-europe.aspx; Anna Manchin, EU Leadership Approval at Record Low in Spain,
Greece (January 8, 2014), http://www.gallup.com/poll/166757/leadership-approval-recordlow-spain-greece.aspx.
2
PETER SCHUCK, WHY GOVERNMENTS FAIL SO OFTEN 18-19 (2014).

Vol. 1:1]

Broken Governments Across the Atlantic

59

national level; for public spending or infrastructural projects it mostly
has to rely on member states.3 The frequent references to policy experiences
from abroad, and Europe in particular, throughout Why Government Fails So
Often,4 do show though that on concrete issues comparison is useful,
as long as it occurs with a sufficient dose of contextual sensibility. A
good reason to explore a comparison ‘light’ further is that, the EU may have
something to offer exactly because of its ongoing legitimacy and performance
crisis. Due to the (increasing) sense that European integration may not be
inevitable and let alone ‘ever closer’, EU institutions have had relatively strong
incentives for experimenting with institutional ‘fixes’ for policy failure.
Schuck concludes that among a multitude of solutions that are
unfeasible because the systemic drivers of government failure they target are
so deeply rooted, the one element that can be improved quite easily and
relatively cheaply is ‘policy information’.5 Since this assertion tallies with the
European experience, this brief commentary focuses on this particular aspect
and proposes two developments involving the EU that are worth keeping an
eye on for anyone interested in incremental improvement of the informational
input into policy-making and legislative processes.
II. POLITICS AND REGULATORY IMPACT INFORMATION
An example of an ‘informational solution’ is presented in the final
chapter of Why Government Fails So Often, where a legislative checklist for
Congressional Committees to use in order to ensure that their statutes avoid the
worst mistakes is proposed.6 This hints on the one hand at a wish to involve
Congress more in ‘evidence-based lawmaking’ and on the other at a resignation
to fairly modest ambitions in this regard (‘avoiding the worst mistakes’). Odd
as it may seem, in the light of the aforementioned legitimacy crisis, to look to
the European Union for hints on how to improve regulatory information
structures there are policy areas where regulation at the EU level has been
relatively successful. One of those is environmental protection of which the
Clean Air for Europe Thematic Strategy from 2005 is a good example.7
3

GEONDOMENICO MAJONE, REGULATING EUROPE 2-3 (1996).
See SCHUCK, supra note 3, at 384 (describing the Danish policy experience with housing
programs).
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A recent study found that because of specific EU policies to reduce air
pollution across Europe, in combination with new technologies, 80,000 deaths
are prevented each year and there is a 35% reduction of fine particles in the
atmosphere over the last 40 years.8 In the case of European clean air policies,
the particular European brand of regulatory impact analysis can be credited
with at least a small part of the success. The most eye-catching difference
between the American and European toolkits for regulatory analysis is that at
the EU level legislative bills that need approval from the European Parliament
undergo an impact assessment as well. The initial assessment is carried out by
the European Commission, the sole institution empower to initiate legislation,
but the European Parliament committed to additionally assessing the impacts
whenever it introduces substantial amendments.9 This latter element exactly
has not gotten off the ground too well, but the procedure is managing better
than any other in the world to engage a parliament in a discourse of impacts or
at the very least to have turned the idea that a parliament should care about the
evidence base of legislation into a mainstream one. Simplifying somewhat, a
unique combination of methodology and presentation is at the core of this
achievement. Paragraph 14 of the 2016 version of the Interinstitutional
Agreement on Better Law-making states the following:
The European Parliament and the Council, upon considering
Commission legislative proposals, will take full account of
the Commission's impact assessments. To that end, impact
assessments shall be presented in such a way as to facilitate
the consideration by the European Parliament and the
Council of the choices made by the Commission.
One concrete way in which the presentation of regulatory impact
information is facilitating consideration by the political decision-makers is the
‘best practice’ of reporting on the findings of the impact analysis in a ‘decision
matrix’. In the more than ten years that the European Union has been
experimenting with impact assessment it has become a champion of multi8

S. T. Turnock et al, The Impact of European Legislative and Technology Measures to
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(stipulating that “[t]he European Parliament and the Council will, when they consider this to
be appropriate and necessary for the legislative process, carry out impact assessments in
relation to their substantial amendments to the Commission's proposal”). A very similar
agreement had been in place since 2003.
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criteria analysis. Multi-criteria analysis evolved from critique of conventional
cost benefit, its main strengths being that it escapes the inherent uncertainties
linked with monetization and that it weighs up multiple options and competing
interests using numerous decision criteria.10 European regulatory policy
explicitly allows for a variety of decision criteria, on the grounds that mandatory
efficiency-based decision-making would be in violation of the treaties.
The argument here would not be that multi-criteria analysis is inherently
superior to cost-benefit analysis – which in many cases still takes center stage –
but that because it offers greater opportunities to highlight trade-offs involved
in policy-making. This happens in the aforementioned matrix, which shows
how different options perform in relation to different criteria (efficiency, costeffectiveness, fundamental rights, coherence…). For instance, the impact
assessment produced by the European Commission on the Clean Air for Europe
Thematic Strategy in the succinct presentation of the aggregated effects, clearly
distinguished between overall efficiency (i.e. the greatest net-benefits to
European society) and cost-effectiveness.11 The discussion that followed
between the European Commission and the European Parliament regarding the
appropriate ambition level of the new policy was prompted by this way of
presenting regulatory impact information.
Of course, many counter-anecdotes can be found in the European
experience, which I am – I cannot emphasize this enough – not presenting for
its perfection, but for its potential on some very specific points. The Clean
Air Strategy Example merely shows that multi-criteria analysis can be a good
starting point for data-based accountability mechanisms involving political
decision-makers. It allows or presenting options when reporting on the basis
for legislative or regulatory policy choices, which offers an opening for actual
political engagement whilst simultaneously framing the terms in which the
final decision would need to be explained.
Certainly, a further defining feature of the European policy process is
that procedures for ‘legislation’ and ‘rule-making’ are much more similar
than in the US, for a start each involving the European Commission and the
European Parliament, albeit in different roles. I do not suggest that it is
feasible in the short term for the US Congress to all of a sudden start taking
note of decision matrixes; the anecdote and brief explanation of the European
preference for the use of multi-criteria analysis in impact analysis process
merely demonstrates that, beyond the checklist idea, well designed ‘information infrastructures’ may stand a chance in the longer term.
10

OLIVIER VARDAKOULIAS, NEW ECON. FOUND., ECONOMICS IN POLICY-MAKING BRIEFING
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III. REGULATORY COOPERATION AND A NEW TYPE
OF POLICY INFORMATION
The term ‘information infrastructure’ is also applicable to a second
development with an underexplored potential for regulatory policy learning:
horizontal regulatory cooperation between the EU and the US as currently
driven by the negotiations of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment
Partnership (TTIP). The trade-driven need to coordinate regulatory policies
may lead to a shared forum for discussing regulatory policies that may
include a variety of public policy considerations far beyond trade. In a recent
special issue of Law & Contemporary Problems on regulatory cooperation
Alberto Alemanno and Jonathan Wiener have argued in favor of learning
from transatlantic regulatory variation.12 What could this look like in more
concrete terms? The European Commission now systematically publishes
negotiation texts, including recently a chapter on shared Good Regulatory
Practices.13 One example of a proposal for a shared practice is on the type of
impact analysis both the US and the EU would commit to carry out on
‘regulatory acts’:
When carrying out a regulatory impact assessment […] each
Party shall ensure that it:
a. considers the need for the proposed regulatory act
and the nature and the significance of the problem the
regulatory act is intended to address;
b. examines feasible regulatory and non-regulatory
alternatives (including the option of not regulating), if
any, that would achieve the objective of the regulatory act;
c. assesses potential short and long term social, economic,
and environmental impacts of such alternatives and the
anticipated costs and benefits (quantitative, qualitative, or
both, recognizing that some costs and benefits are difficult
to quantify).14

12

Jonathan B. Wiener & Alberto Alemanno, The Future of International Regulatory
Cooperation: TTIP as a Step Toward a Global Regulatory Laboratory, 78 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 103 (2015).
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EUROPEAN UNION, TTIP-EU Proposal for Chapter: Good Regulatory Practices, in EUEU TTIP NEGOTIATIONS (2016), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/march/tradoc_1
54380.pdf.
14
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The European Commission wants to include congressional bills in the
shared definition of ‘regulatory acts’, which matches its own attempts to extend
evidence-based lawmaking to ‘primary legislative processes’ as discussed
above. This, however, is very unlikely to be accepted by the US, where agencies
with rulemaking powers are likely seen as more natural addressees of ‘shared
regulatory practices’. A further proposed chapter seeks to establish strengthened
‘rules of the game’ for regulatory cooperation in specialized areas.15 An earlier
proposal for a ‘Regulatory Cooperation Body’ was aborted, most likely for lack
of support from the US side, and instead the negotiators are clearly still searching
for the appropriate institutional framework for ensuring future regulations are
not (too) incompatible, an endeavor that is hoped to have a more general qualityenhancing effect too.
The negotiation text published by the European Commission shows that
it is thinking in the direction of offering regulators from the other side early
opportunities for cooperation and information exchange,16 and a joint
commitment to take into account each other's approaches on their merits17
“before we go ahead and regulate.”18 So the idea is not for the US and the EU to
start drafting regulatory policies together, but rather that the
mutual commitment to take into account policy frameworks and regulatory ideas
from the other side of the ocean could serve as an additional test for bias in the
policy process. Taken to the extreme this could even take the shape of peer
reviews of regulatory frameworks, but even without such strong
institutionalization, regulatory cooperation presents an opportunity for a
different type of information to enter domestic policy processes. Exchanges
based on regulatory information such as the ones promoted under a possible
future TTIP could therefore be a valuable addition to the range of sources of
solutions identified in Why Government Fails So Often.
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The remarks above are intended to echo the call for incrementalism
from Peter Schuck’s insightful book.19 Rather than using the European
experiment for expanding or validating Schuck’s already multi-dimensional
15

EUROPEAN UNION, TTIP-EU Proposal for Chapter: Regulatory Cooperation, in EU-EU
TTIP NEGOTIATIONS (2016), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/march/tradoc_1543
77.pdf.
16
Id. at art. x.4 para. 2-a.
17
Id. at art. x.4 para. 2-b.
18
EUROPEAN COMM’N, REGULATORY COOPERATION IN TTIP: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
EU'S REVISED PROPOSAL 5 (2016), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/march/tradoc
154378.pdf.
19
SCHUCK, supra note 3, at 34.

64

Journal of Law & Public Affairs

[July 2016

diagnosis of government failure, the aim was to highlight EU-related
procedures around ‘policy information’ or ‘regulatory information’ that
provide clues for possible new directions in attempts to improve such
information and its use. The two ‘information infrastructures’ presented here,
multi-criteria analysis as our best shot at infusing political legislative process
with regulatory analysis without technocratizing them and regulatory
cooperation as an additional check on regulatory policies, are very different
in nature. One is an almost technical device that is representative for a
uniquely European style of impact analysis, the other an ideational ‘highway
in the sky’ across the Atlantic and neither is a catch-all solution for the
problems Schuck identifies. However, they do represent worthwhile avenues
for further thinking about solutions geared towards avoiding unnecessary
policy failures.

